The main topic of this paper is the investigation of generalized amalgamation properties for simple theories. That is, we are trying to answer the question of when a simple theory has the property of n-dimensional amalgamation, where two-dimensional amalgamation is the Independence Theorem for simple theories. We develop the notions of strong n-simplicity and n-simplicity for 1≤n≤ω, where both “1-simple” and “strongly 1-simple” are the same as “simple”. For strong n-simplicity, we present examples of simple unstable theories in each subclass (...) and prove a characteristic property of strong n-simplicity in terms of strong n-dividing, a strengthening of the dependence relation called dividing in simple theories. We prove a strong three-dimensional amalgamation property for strongly 2-simple theories, and, under an additional assumption, a strong -dimensional amalgamation property for strongly n-simple theories. In the last section of the paper we comment on why strong n-simplicity is called strong. (shrink)

We study generalized amalgamation properties in simple theories. We formulate a notion of generalized amalgamation in such a way so that the properties are preserved when we pass from T to Teq or Theq; we provide several equivalent ways of formulating the notion of generalized amalgamation.We define two distinct hierarchies of simple theories characterized by their amalgamation properties; examples are given to show the difference between the hierarchies.

Building on Hrushovski's work in [5], we study definable groupoids in stable theories and their relationship with 3-uniqueness and finite internal covers. We introduce the notion of retractability of a definable groupoid (which is slightly stronger than Hrushovski's notion of eliminability), give some criteria for when groupoids are retractable, and show how retractability relates to both 3-uniqueness and the splitness of finite internal covers. One application we give is a new direct method of constructing non-eliminable groupoids from witnesses to the (...) failure of 3-uniqueness. Another application is a proof that any finite internal cover of a stable theory with a centerless liaison groupoid is almost split. (shrink)

The new result of this paper is that for θ-stable we have S1[θ] = D[θ, L, ∞]. S1 is Hrushovski's rank. This is an improvement of a result of Kim and Pillay, who for simple theories under the assumption that either of the ranks be finite obtained the same identity. Only the first equality is new, the second equality is a result of Shelah from the seventies. We derive it by studying localizations of several rank functions, we get the followingMain (...) Theorem. Suppose that μ is regular satisfying μ ≥ |T|+, p is a finite type, and Δ is a set of formulas closed under Boolean operations. If either R[p, Δ, μ+] < ∞ or p is Δ-stable and μ satisfies “for every sequence {μi : i < |Δ| + ℵ0} of cardinals μi < μ we have that equation image holds”, then S[p, Δ, μ+] = D[p, Δ, μ+] = R[p, Δ, μ+].The S rank above is a localized version of Hrushovski's S1 rank. This rank, as well as our systematic use of local stability, allows us to get a more conceptual proof of the equality of D and R, which is an old result of Shelah. A particular case of the theorem offers a new sufficient condition for the equality of S1 and D[·, L, ∞]. We also manage, due to a more general approach, to avoid some combinatorial difficulties present in Shelah's original exposition. (shrink)

We define an appropriate analog of the Morley rank in a totally transcendental homogeneous model with type diagram D. We show that if RM[p] = α then for some 1 ≤ n < ω the type p has n, but not n + 1, distinct D-extensions of rank α. This is surprising, because the proof of the statement in the first-order case depends heavily on compactness. We also show that types over (D,ℵ₀)-homogeneous models have multiplicity (Morley degree) 1.

We study when classes can have the disjoint amalgamation property for a proper initial segment of cardinals. Theorem A For every natural number k, there is a class $K_k $ defined by a sentence in $L_{\omega 1.\omega } $ that has no models of cardinality greater than $ \supset _{k - 1} $ , but $K_k $ has the disjoint amalgamation property on models of cardinality less than or equal to $\mathfrak{N}_{k - 3} $ and has models of cardinality $\mathfrak{N}_{k (...) - 1} $ . More strongly, we can have disjoint amalgamation up to $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ for α > ω, but have a bound on size of models. Theorem B For every countable ordinal a, there is a class $K_\alpha $ defined by a sentence in $L_{\omega 1.\omega } $ that has no models of cardinality greater than $ \supset _{\omega 1} $ , but K does have the disjoint amalgamation property on models of cardinality less than or equal to $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ . Finally we show that we can extend the $\mathfrak{N}_\alpha $ to $ \supset _\alpha $ in the second theorem consistently with ZFC and while having $\mathfrak{N}_i \ll \supset _i $ for 0 > i < α. Similar results hold for arbitrary ordinals α with |α|= K and $L_{k + ,\omega } $. (shrink)

In this paper we study the relativized Lascar Galois group of a strong type. The group is a quasi-compact connected topological group, and if in addition the underlying theory T is G-compact, then the group is compact. We apply compact group theory to obtain model theoretic results in this note. -/- For example, we use the divisibility of the Lascar group of a strong type to show that, in a simple theory, such types have a certain model theoretic property that (...) we call divisible amalgamation. -/- The main result of this paper is that if c is a finite tuple algebraic over a tuple a, the Lascar group of stp(ac) is abelian, and the underlying theory is G-compact, then the Lascar groups of stp(ac) and of stp(a) are isomorphic. To show this, we prove a purely compact group-theoretic result that any compact connected abelian group is isomorphic to its quotient by every finite subgroup. -/- Several (counter)examples arising in connection with the theoretical development of this note are presented as well. For example, we show that, in the main result above, neither the assumption that the Lascar group of stp(ac) is abelian, nor the assumption of c being finite can be removed. (shrink)

We show that in a stable first-order theory, the failure of higher dimensional type amalgamation can always be witnessed by algebraic structures that we call n-ary polygroupoids. This generalizes a result of Hrushovski in [16] that failures of 4-amalgamation are witnessed by definable groupoids. The n-ary polygroupoids are definable in a mild expansion of the language.

The article examines the situation of the presence of virtual voices in modern reality. The voices of virtual assistants model a new relationship between voice and face, with anonymity and depersonalization being a priority. The closeness of the face from the voice peculiar to virtual assistants, the detachment of the voice from the facial "accompaniment", the fundamental possibility of the existence of a voice without a face — all this gives the voice as an anthropological and cultural phenomenon of modernity (...) fundamentally new parameters. Digital "logic" implies a departure from the human logos, which can be clearly seen in the example of the problem of "gender" of artificial assistants. Special attention is paid to the problem of correlation of voice and artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence as an organizational form of cognition acquires a voice, merges with a voice, becomes a voice. The universal scale of the claims of virtual voices requires theological reflection, because the religious experience of "working" with voices, represented in a wide range of world religions, is able to offer a unique interpretation of the role of the voice in modern times. Internet voices can be called into the liturgical space, where they will be asked to sound in new registers and keys. Digital religion appears as a new liturgical reality, a new common cause. It is significant that the non-spiritual technogenic environment can only offer emptiness — the emptiness of digital dehumanization. Digital-humanitarian unity can be built on the adoption of a spiritual foundation, based on the conclusion of a "pact" on cooperation between the spiritual experience of mankind and cyber-information perspectives. (shrink)

Издание содержит: Мировая философия как философия "глобальной деревни"; Испания и Россия: опыт компаративного исследования; Компаративное видение современной философии образования и др.

For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular representations (...) about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice. (shrink)

Tolstoy’s literary works, as well as a number of events in his life, leave no doubt about the writer’s deep familiarity with law in both the theoretical and practical spheres. In his later years, t...

Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 104-108.

This essay offers a comparative analysis of the notion of trust in Hegel and Confucius. It shows that Hegel’s two senses of trust depend upon his theory of recognition and recognitive struggle. The competitive thrust of Hegel’s account of trust, it argues, introduces a series of problems that cannot be adequately resolved within his theory, since it presupposes the kinds of trusting relations—self-, intersubjective- and world-trust—that it purports to explain. This essay then turns to the Confucian notions of xin 心 (...) and li 理 to address the problems in the Hegelian account. It concludes by outlining the Confucian account’s salience for critical social theory. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationships between Themistocles and the lyric poets Simonides of Ceos and Timocreon of Rhodes in Plutarch's Life of Themistocles. It is argued that Plutarch expects the reader to connect explicit references to the poets and their works with stories located outside the narrative in the anecdotal biographic tradition. Through an implicit synkrisis with the protagonist, the poets' anecdotal personae create a narrative counterbalance that suggests a faultline in Themistocles' characterization that, in turn, reflects the model (...) of the "timocratic" man in Plato's Republic. (shrink)

In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”, Hegel gives a detailed specification of the theses about the war that were claimed in earlier papers and manuscripts, but his position is not fundamentally changed. In the “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel advocates governments’ need and right to initiate a war from time to time in order to prevent both the isolation and atomization, and let individuals feel the death. As in the past, the war, as Hegel says, has a (...) moment of ethical life. In the “Philosophy of Right” Hegel introduces final deliberations about war that rely on ideas of his earlier paper about natural law even more than in the “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Hegel emphasizes the ethical role of sacrifice in the war and expresses opinions critical of not an abstract perpetual peace but a concrete philosophical project of Kant. Due to Hegel, Kant’s perpetual peace does not resemble a perpetual deception, since the required union of states is elusive and none except the world spirit in the world history can be a praetor. In line with Heraclitus, Hegel maintains that wars underlie the nature of things. I contribute to the discussions of Hegel scholars if Hegel’s philosophy glorifies a war or not as follows: I substitute the term “glorification” with the term “bellicisme” that suits better to measured, not snobbish and deprived of certain historical implications Hegel’s theses about reasonableness, necessity, the ethicality of war and ethicality of perpetual peace illness. (shrink)

If the technological situation is unique, the ways to understand the contemporary moral condition are not. We link it to age-old questions: in fact, the power promised by technol-ogy only establishes a new form of human finitude. In the face of this continuity of the fundamental moral condition, we examine a number of alternative ways of thinking about the basis of responsible innovation, exploring the metaphors of quasi-parental and political responsibilities, as well as the place of virtue in innovation and (...) the role of cul-tural narratives in helping us understand the limits of responsible innovation. (shrink)

Alexei V. Samsonovich, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 49 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400083.

We start by remarks on the scientific and societal context of today's theoretical physics. Major classes of models for physics to be explored at the LHC are then reviewed. This leads us to propose an LHC timeline and a list of potential effects on theoretical physics and the society. We then explore three conceptual questions connected with the LHC physics: symmetry (and symmetry breaking), effective field theory, and fine tuning.

Functional information means an encoded network of functions in living organisms from molecular signaling pathways to an organism’s behavior. It is represented by two components: code and an interpretation system, which together form a self-sustaining semantic closure. Semantic closure allows some freedom between components because small variations of the code are still interpretable. The interpretation system consists of inference rules that control the correspondence between the code and the function (phenotype) and determines the shape of the fitness landscape. The utility (...) factor operates at multiple time scales: short-term selection drives evolution towards higher survival and reproduction rate within a given fitness landscape, and long-term selection favors those fitness landscapes that support adaptability and lead to evolutionary expansion of certain lineages. Inference rules make short-term selection possible by shaping the fitness landscape and defining possible directions of evolution, but they are under control of the long-term selection of lineages. Communication normally occurs within a set of agents with compatible interpretation systems, which I call communication system. Functional information cannot be directly transferred between communication systems with incompatible inference rules. Each biological species is a genetic communication system that carries unique functional information together with inference rules that determine evolutionary directions and constraints. This view of the relation between utility and inference can resolve the conflict between realism/positivism and pragmatism. Realism overemphasizes the role of inference in evolution of human knowledge because it assumes that logic is embedded in reality. Pragmatism substitutes usefulness for truth and therefore ignores the advantage of inference. The proposed concept of evolutionary pragmatism rejects the idea that logic is embedded in reality; instead, inference rules are constructed within each communication system to represent reality, and they evolve towards higher adaptability on a long time scale. (shrink)

In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language , Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction. Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions ( Unsinn and sinnlos ) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian (...) theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism. (shrink)

This article discusses Vladimir Vasil’evich Veidle, a philosopher and scholar of cultural study of the Silver Age and a brilliant expert on Alexander Pushkin’s works. The focus is on th...

On the 28th of October, 2006, Alexander Vladimirovich Kuznetsov, so is his full name, would have turned 80. Although belated, the editorial board of Logic and Logical Philosophy, we, the editors and contributors of the present issue, and other members of the logic community mark this event with the present issue. Most of those who contributed to it knew Kuznetsov in person and/or were influenced by him or by his ideas, which very often resided in somebody else’s papers or became (...) part of a scientific folklore. But, to be sure, there are even more mathematicians and logicians who have been witnesses to his scientific activity and/or have taken advantage of its results. (shrink)

Focusing on Walter Benjamin's earliest pieces dedicated to school reform and the student movement, this article traces the basic critical approaches informing his mature thought back to his struggle to critically implement and transform the theory of concept formation and value presentation developed by his Freiburg teacher, Heinrich Rickert. It begins with an account of Rickert's work, specifically of the concept of Darstellung (presentation) and its central role in Rickert's postmetaphysical theory of historical research (which he characterizes as exclusively concerned (...) with the Kantian quid juris). It shows that Rickert develops a speculative but practical theory of value recognition, which nevertheless leaves the status of value itself undetermined. Contra Rickert, Benjamin returns to the ignored quid facti, or origin of value, and shows that a metacritical, postmetaphysical approach such as Rickert's ultimately limits possible experience rather than grounding it. This basic insight, it is argued, is the cornerstone of Benjamin's concept of critique. (shrink)

The modern popularity of the Kantian definition of enlightenment often leads to a distorted notion that his understanding of enlightenment was dominant already during his lifetime, expressing the quintessence of all-European Enlightenment. This turns our attention away from entire layers of philosophical thought, since the Kantian definition of enlightenment in the late eighteenth century was neither the only one nor the preeminent one. The study of alternatives represented in the German philosophy of that period gives a deeper insight into the (...) originality of the Kantian approach with regard to both its merits and demerits. The presentation of the Kantian definition of enlightenment as the standard turns out to be a rather late historical phenomenon. Even Kant’s closest followers did not turn to his interpretation of enlightenment and, indeed, were sharply critical of the phenomenon as a banal and superficial one, opposed to faith. Further transformation of the views on the Enlightenment led to the emergence of the inauthentic terms of “Enlightenment” and Lumières applied post factum to the eighteenth-century philosophy in Europe. As a result, the essence of the enlightenment was defined not so much by the eighteenth-century Enlighteners as by historians and philosophers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who constructed a model notion of enlightenment against which philosophical figures were then compared. This approach ignored, first, the authentic definition of enlightenment (in Germany and Russia in the eighteenth century there were authentic terms “Aufklärung” and “prosveshcheniye”, and in France the proto-term “eclairé”) and, second, important national differences in the interpretation of the phenomenon. The emasculate Kantian definition of enlightenment used to legitimise the proposed approach. A closer look at the authentic view of eighteenth-century philosophers and a comparison of the Kantian approach to enlightenment with its alternatives that existed at the time might perhaps demonstrate that the philosophical and heuristic potential of the allegedly overcome and discredited Enlightenment is far from exhausted and is still relevant today. (shrink)

In this article, I reconstruct Walter Benjamin's philosophy of language and refine the non-predicational view of meaning often attributed to him. By situating his 1916 essay ‘On Language as Such and on the Language of Man’ within the context of his struggle with Russell's paradox and its implications for phenomenology, I show how Benjamin arrives at his conception of non-conceptual content as an environmentally embedded affordance that is directly apprehended by appropriately situated and capable agents. This affordance-like character of meaning (...) explains Benjamin's account of communication, Adamic naming, and his famous distinction between linguistic and spiritual essences (sprachliche- and geistige Wesen). I conclude by showing why translation is central to his views on expression and communication and how it reinforces his account of language-use. (shrink)

This article uses the personal diaries and memoirs of Archpriest Sergius (Sergei) Bulgakov to examine the circumstances of his expulsion from Bolshevik-occupied Crimea in late 1922. At the time, he was rector of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Yalta. The expulsion of Fr. Sergius was part of a large-scale operation to expel the humanist intelligentsia, who did not fit within the ideological contours of the new government. We will examine the political aspects of the condemnations of Fr. Sergius’s doctrine of (...) Sophia, the theological development of which he began in exile. We will also examine aspects of Fr. Sergius’s attitude to monarchy and his belief in the “white tsar,” noting that Bulgakov’s position as an émigré could hardly be characterized as monarchical. Sophiology may be the political equivalent of ecclesiastical democracy, of faith in the ecclesiastical people and the Christian community, which was alien to the conservative monarchism of Orthodox believers abroad, centered in Serbia’s Sremski Karlovci. We will examine the circumstances of the church’s condemnation of Fr. Sergius, which took place against the context of canonical uncertainty, and we will touch upon some aspects of the contemporary reception of Sophiology in Russia in a political context (V. Bibikhin, O. Kirichenko). (shrink)

We argue that the Rawlsian social contract argument advanced for stakeholder theory by R. Edward Freeman, writing alone and with William M. Evan, fails in three main ways. First, it is true to Rawls in neither form, nor purpose, nor the level of knowledge (or ignorance) required to motivate the veil of ignorance. Second, it fails to tailor the veil of ignorance to the fairness conditions that are required to solve the moral problem that Freeman and Evan set out to (...) solve (whereas Rawls’s own use of the device surely tailors the veil of ignorance to the problem of designing a just social order). Third, the argument, considered apart from its claimed Rawlsian pedigree, fails to bolster the stakeholder theory because it fails to demonstrate the rationality of adopting the institutional rules that Freeman and Evan favor. (shrink)